BALPA has passed on to ABTN an interesting paper produced by Crupax Security of Ottawa, Canada. Whilst obviously advocating their double door system the article nevertheless does ask some very serious questions. The writer is Larry Martens, President Crupax Security.
”For some time we have heard a number of pilots” associations and others express support for a double door cockpit protection system similar to what the Israeli airline El Al has used for many years with notable success. In the aftermath of 9/11 El Al was acclaimed as the safest airline in the world, and the real reason was not the racial profiling, armed pilots and air marshals that the media sensationalized.
There is only one thing that can make a cockpit safe, and the Israelis discovered that many years ago. It is a double door cockpit protection system that has never been breached even though there have been numerous attempts. It provides a physical barrier that prevents any unauthorized person from getting near the cockpit door when it is open. The only problem with the Israeli system is that it cannot be retrofitted into existing aircraft because of space, weight and cost limitations. Airbus is building a double door system into its new A-380, but there is no such protection contemplated for existing airliners.
Our company began designing a double door system immediately after the FAA mandated the new fortified cockpit door. It was obvious to us from the outset that the new door would have little or no deterrent effect on trained terrorist hijackers. Hijackers do not normally break into cockpit doors, but simply wait until someone opens the door for them, then rush in and overpower the pilots. In that situation the new door is no improvement over the old door, as both allow entry when unlocked. Our research shows that cockpit doors are opened an average of eight times per flight, or every 20 minutes, so it makes no difference how strong the door is; the vulnerability is constant. We met with senior officials of the FAA and discussed this serious shortcoming in detail, however they have seen fit to take no action that would alleviate the obvious danger.
The US government implemented an air marshal program and the arming of commercial pilots, both programmes coming at enormous cost but with little security value. The money spent on these programmes in one week alone could equip every airliner in the USA with an impregnable double door system that would make both programmes redundant.
Research shows that hijacking an airliner is actually easier and safer for a hijacker now than it was before 9/11. All the intruder has to do is slip in through the open door and lock it behind him; it then protects him from passengers and air marshals in the cabin, and the pilots are at his mercy. Don”t believe for a minute that pilots can effectively defend themselves against a suicidal intruder trained in martial arts. Those who believe arming pilots will stop hijacking are not dealing with reality. Most pilots will tell you that in no uncertain terms if you bother to ask them.
What makes the present situation even more perilous is the fact that a single suicide hijacker, using the new door for protection, can commandeer even the largest airline with no help from anyone. Before the installation of the new door that was not possible, as it required at least three or four hijackers to subdue the passengers so that they could not interfere with the takeover. This fact adds significantly to the danger level.
The investigation into the 9/11 tragedy revealed a probability that, while the main perpetrators were suicidal, some of their underlings were not aware that they were on a suicide mission. It is not that difficult to find a single hijacker who is willing to die for a cause, but it is much more difficult to assemble a group of four or more who share that view. The FAA has unwittingly solved this problem for the suicidal hijacker, as he can now accomplish his mission without enlisting accomplices”.
Clearly this paper gives some food for thought.