Remember Silverjet? Eos? Maxjet? They were all part of the early Noughties, pre-economic crash confidence that all-business class long-haul carriers would achieve both the loads and the average fares to justify their existence and turn profits. They all died.
Since then we've seen all-business class flights (BA's London City Airport-JFK service) and new all-business class carriers (La Compagnie). However, the former struggled to attract enough passengers despite its close proximity to London's financial institutions and the latter's Orly-Newark route, combined with its lack of partners, means that its appeal is dependent on point-to-point business.
But Norwegian is leading a charge of niche low-cost long-haul carriers. It is attracting the passengers but aggressive expansion has meant deep debt and its business model doesn't seem to have profit as part of its strategy. Its share price, not surprisingly, soared after IAG's recent acquisition of 4.6% of the company. The message is very much that an acquisition of Norwegian is very much on the cards.
But why would IAG which owns two of the largest airlines in the world, BA and Iberia, and has a strong commercial relationship with another, American Airlines, want a long-haul low-cost carrier? After all it has its own low-cost carrier Level with bases in Barcelona and Paris whose long-haul destinations including Buenos Aires, Montreal and Boston.
Moreover, British Airways has just launched "hand baggage only" fares on some of its long-haul routes including Boston, Hong Kong and Singapore.
But what are the consequences for corporate travel programmes?
The business reasons for IAG's move are several. Beyond the obvious removal of a competitor and back office synergies (ie staff and systems cost cuts), IAG probably wants Norwegian's Gatwick slots. These may not be as valuable on the balance sheet as those at Heathrow but with London airport capacity getting more constrained every day that the decision on a new London runway is delayed, slots at Gatwick become more valuable for carriers whose business model depends on an extensive network to lure and support high passenger volumes.
It's not location which makes Heathrow slots so valuable. It's the fact that those slots are not dominated by flights to the Mediterranean beach resorts so loved by the stag weekend brigade. It's because of the strength and depth of its extensive route network. Demand is not limited to those who want only point-to-point flights.
Gatwick has direct services to most European business cities, some of which are run by BA but there is no direct service between Gatwick and Brussels, nor Gatwick and Moscow. The only direct service between Gatwick and Stockholm is on Norwegian and only easyJet offers a direct service between Gatwick and Milan.
Those are some notable service gaps for an airport which aims to be an international business airport. BA might want to fill those gaps in its route network to ensure it retains its appeal to large business customers who help it achieve its profitability targets.
The status quo works for BA so long as its home base of Heathrow remains viable. But IAG head Willie Walsh has been a vocal critic of Heathrow's intention to raise airport fees and slots at Heathrow are limited and getting more expensive all the time.
Norwegian's slots could give IAG the alternative of a second London hub and protect its corporate business.