At first glance, it seems odd that United Airlines should withdraw from the Heathrow-JFK route.It is one of the most lucrative in the world and one which other carriers are clamouring to serve.
It is also a closed market as under the Bermuda II agreement only four carriers can do this route: United, American Airlines, BA and Virgin Atlantic.
But for the US airline, there is logic to its decision. It runs just one service a day on the route. Its three rivals run far more: American and BA six a day and Virgin four a day. Against such choice, United did not find its service hugely profitable.
Instead, the airline which came out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in February and posted profits of $119m for the second quarter of 2006, is playing to what it sees as its new strength: the Asia Pacific market.
It plans to add 40 year round flights a week to this region including a new service between Washington and Tokyo, an expanded service from San Francisco to Seoul, increased frequency from San Francisco to Hong Kong and the re-instatement of the San Francisco-Taipei service.
United see this as putting its aircraft onto its profitable routes rather than letting them serve less profitable ones.
Delta Air Lines, which is still in Chapter 11 protection, has bought the route authority for London-New York from United for $21m and plans to start a daily Gatwick-JFK service in the autumn, adding a second daily flight in the spring 2007.
It too is playing to what it sees as its strengths – moving out of US domestic routes and concentrating more on transatlantic services. The carrier has added numerous new services and now describes itself as the "world's largest airline between Europe and the United Sates."
In the UK alone the airline will operate seven flights a day this winter from London, Manchester and Edinburgh to the States.
But this jockeying position tells us something. Two great airlines, neither enjoying the best of financial health, are dramatically shifting strategy to bring them longed for stability and profit. It is of course the scourge of overcapacity – too many airlines chasing top few passengers.
The Financial Times once brutally asked what was the point of Alitalia, the lame duck's lame duck. It may be harsh but it is equally valid to ask whether some measure of consolidation may be helpful in North America. (It certainly would be in Europe.)
But there may also be shorter term repercussions to United's decision to abandon London-New York. Just where does it leave the Bermuda II agreement? And does it bring any nearer a genuine liberal "Open Skies" agreement between the United States and the European Union?
Clearly Bermuda II has been weakened by United's decision and airlines anxious to fly the Heathrow-JFK route, like Delta and British Midland, will no doubt draw attention to this.
They will claim that there is now less choice and that the three incumbent airlines will benefit from the fall out.
As for Open Skies, there are proposals on the table which would allow far more carriers to fly on this route – although crucially, it does not say how they will acquire the slots at Heathrow, already near capacity, or the route authority to do so.
As the sticking point in the negotiation is over foreign ownership of carriers in the States, it may be some time until any new agreement comes into force.
But certainly the partial undermining of the cosy and dated Bermuda agreement should bring some urgency to the negotiators.
But lastly, United's decision also tells us that the Heathrow-JFK route may not always the goldmine those excluded from it believe it to be.